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Abstract
This paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. We show
that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to
the supply of deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of
the market. We characterize the role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers
and analyse the consequences of mergers on loan and deposit rates. When the value
of diversification is suﬃciently strong, bank mergers generate an increase in the
welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than
borrowers, bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers.
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1 Introduction
Given the continuing consolidation trend in the banking sector, concerns are often raised
about the eﬀects of bank mergers on the competitiveness of the industry. A distinguishing
feature in banking is the key role played by risk management. Banks have to control and
select the risks inherent in the management of deposits and loans portfolios. Mergers may
allow banks to diversify some of these risks and therefore aﬀect the outcome of competition.
This paper formulates a simple modelling framework to analyse the role of risk and
diversification in banking competition and to quantify the impact of mergers on the welfare
of borrowers and depositors. The model has two main ingredients. First, banks are
assumed to be risk averse or behave in a risk averse fashion. This assumption is in line
with the evidence in Hughes and Mester (1998) who attribute the banks’ choice of financial
capital (above the cost-minimising level) to risk aversion. Risk averse banks can improve
their protection against financial risks by merging with other banks. Through mergers,
banks can achieve a larger scale, increase their geographical scope, and oﬀer a more diverse
mix of financial services.1 In addition, better diversified banks may take on additional risks,
by holding riskier loans or reducing equity ratios (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).
Second, banks are imperfect competitors in the markets for loans and deposits. Fol-
lowing the Monti-Klein framework, we model banks as financial intermediaries that grant
loans and collect deposits. A limited number of banks set loan and deposit rates inde-
pendently. Subsequently, borrowers and depositors endowed with diﬀerent preferences
choose the bank to which they supply and from which they demand funds. We extend the
oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model of banking competition to accommodate the
several types of risk that are present in the banking sector. For example, in our setting
banks are subject to interbank rate risk (which aﬀects them all) and to the default risk of
a particular loan (which aﬀects only one bank).
Our first contribution is the generalisation of the Monti-Klein model of banking com-
petition to allow for uncertainty and risk aversion.2 By assuming linear demand and
1In the US for example the ratio of equity capital (devoted to risk management) tends to be lower
for larger banks (Hughes et al., 1996 and 2000). According to McAllister and MacManus (1993), the
standard deviation of the rate of return on loans seems to fall dramatically beyond the $1 billion mark in
loan portfolios.
2See Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaﬀee (1974) for early models of risk allocation by risk-averse financial
intermediaries. With respect to these papers, our main innovation here is the addition of imperfect
competition among intermediaries.
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supply systems and mean-variance preferences, we obtain a simple closed-form solution of
the equilibrium. We show that the classic separation result between deposit and lending
markets breaks down when the shocks in the loan and deposit markets are correlated.
Furthermore, this setting allows us to analyse the impact of the diﬀerent types of risk on
the competitive behaviour of banks. For example, as the risk in the interbank market
increases, banks reduce their deposit rates but increase their loan rates.
The second contribution is the analysis of the eﬀects of bank mergers. Merged banks
are able to diversify some of the risks and essentially reduce the risk cost associated with
more borrowing or lending activity. When banks are imperfectly competitive, a cost re-
duction makes the merged bank more aggressive. In response to a tougher competitor,
the rival banks have an incentive to cut back their activity to the benefit of the merged
bank. Although rivals might oﬀer fewer loans and collect fewer deposits, the reduction is
compensated by the increased activity by the merged bank. As a result both lenders and
borrowers might be better oﬀ as a result of the merger. The change in welfare for the
two sides of the market crucially depends on the correlation of their respective shocks. If
depositors have more correlated shocks–as when bank runs are a serious concern–bank
mergers are worse for depositors than for borrowers.
This paper draws on recent developments in the industrial economics literature on the
analysis of competition with risk averse firms. Asplund (2002) shows that risk-aversion in-
duces quantity-competing firms to set lower quantities. Intuitively, risk-aversion increases
the concern for low profit states (low demands or high costs) and induces the firm to
perform well in those scenarios. And, indeed, both lower demands and higher costs in-
duce firms to set lower quantities. From the technical point of view, this paper extends
the model developed by Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006) to a setting with bilateral
uncertainty and correlation across shocks.
In a recent paper, Carletti et al. (forthcoming) also analyse the impact of bank mergers
on loan competition, but focus on the role of liquidity and reserve management. They
build a model in which (risk-neutral) banks compete to provide long-term (deterministic)
loans, while facing short-term uncertain deposit withdrawals. In their model, mergers
allow banks to internally reshuﬄe reserves according to the liquidity shocks. As a result,
merged banks are able to reduce reserve holdings and face lower financing costs and may
ultimately reduce their loan rates.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyses the
eﬀects of risk aversion on bank competition. Section 4 studies the causes and consequences
of bank mergers. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Model
Loans and Deposits. Following the oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model pre-
sented in Freixas and Rochet (1997), assume that n banks (indexed by i = 1, ..., n) compete
in the market for deposits and loans. Each bank i is confronted with an (inverse) downward
sloping demand for loans rl,i(Li, L−i) and an (inverse) upward sloping supply of deposits
rd,i(Di, D−i). It selects the amount of loans that it wants to oﬀer, Li, and the amount of
deposits it wants to collect, Di, and the loan and deposit rates adjust to equate supply
and demand. Banks take into account not only the amount of loans, L−i, and deposits,
D−i, oﬀered by their rivals but also the eﬀect of the quantity they oﬀer on the rate they
obtain.
The banking technology available to each bank is given by Ci(Di, Li), which can be
interpreted as the cost of managing a volume Di of deposits and a volume Li of loans. The
diﬀerence between loans and deposits, the reserves, Ri = Li−Di, is divided into two: the
cash reserves, Ti, and the net position on the interbank market,Mi. Contrary to interbank
positions, cash reserves bear no interest. Hence, cash reserves are optimally chosen at the
minimum level defined by the regulator, Ti = αDi, a proportion α of deposits. As a result,
the net position on the interbank market is given by Mi = (1− α)Di − Li.
Banks profits are given by
πi = rl,i(Li, L−i)Li + rMi − rd,i(Di, D−i)Di − Ci(Di, Li),
where r is the rate at which the Central Bank refinances commercial banks. For simplicity,
we assume that this rate is equal to the interbank rate. Substituting the optimal net
position in the interbank market, Mi = (1− α)Di − Li, profits are
πi = [rl,i(Li, L−i)− r]Li + [r(1− α)− rd,i(Di, D−i)]Di − Ci(Di, Li). (1)
Uncertainty. Diﬀerent types of uncertainty are present in the banking industry. First,
the interbank rate fluctuates. Therefore, it can be written as r = r + η where η denotes
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the deviation from its expected value, r, with E(η) = 0 and V ar(η) = σ2η. Second, the
demand and supply of funds might not be deterministic either. Widespread shocks, for
example, may aﬀect borrowers’ or depositors’ willingness to supply and demand funds.
Idiosyncratic shocks on the other hand may aﬀect borrowers’ or depositors’ preferences for
one bank or the other. Fear of a bank run might generate a negative shock to a particular
bank, whereas a bank panic may generate negative shocks correlated across the industry.
Assuming a linear demand for loans, a random intercept captures the presence of both
systemic and idiosyncratic uncertainty,
rl,i(Li, L−i) = al + υl,i − Li − blL−i,
where υl,i has mean 0, variance σ2υl , and correlation coeﬃcient ρl with respect to υl,j for
any j 6= i.3 As a particular example, the banks may be subject to a common shock only.
This happens when υl,i ≡ υl,i for any i and j, i.e. when ρl = 1. As a second example, the
banks may be subject to distributional uncertainty only, υl,i ≡ θl,i − 1n
Pn
j=1 θl,j where θl,i
are independently identically distributed idiosyncratic shocks with mean 0 and variance
σ2θl. In this formulation, the total market demand is deterministic (
Pn
i=1 υl,i ≡ 0) for any
number of banks n, but the allocation of this demand to the banks is uncertain.4 In this
second example, σ2υl =
n−1
n σ
2
θl and (for n > 1) ρl = −
1
n−1 . More generally, υl,i represents
a shock in the willingness to pay for the particular type of loan oﬀered by bank i.
Similarly, we allow for common and/or distributional uncertainty in the linear supply
of deposits,
rd,i(Di,D−i) = ad + υd,i +Di + bdD−i,
where υd,i has mean 0, variance σ2υd, and correlation coeﬃcient ρd with respect to υd,j for
any j 6= i. Additionally, the demand and supply of funds in a particular bank could also
be correlated. Indeed, bad news about the viability of a particular bank might not only
discourage the supply of deposits but also depress the demand for loans. We denote the
(symmetric) correlation coeﬃcient of υl,i and υd,i for any i by ρl,d.
3The parameter bl ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of product relatedness, with bl = 0 corresponding to
unrelated products and bl = 1 to homogenous products. Implicitly, we are assuming that lenders not
only care about the loan rate but also about other loan or bank characteristics. Linear demands for loans
can be obtained from quadratic utility functions with diﬀerent tastes for the diﬀerent loans oﬀered–see
Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006) for a detailed derivation.
4Clearly, the demand of a monopoly bank is deterministic: υl,i ≡ 0 for n = 1.
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Finally, the cost of supplying loans and deposits might also be random due, for example,
to uncertain management costs or to unpaid loans. Assuming again a linear cost function,
the constant marginal costs of loan and deposit management can be written respectively as
cl + γl,i and cd + γd,i, with E(γl,i) = E(γd,i) = 0 and V ar(γl,i) = σ2γ
l
and V ar(γd,i) = σ2γ
d
.
Bank’s Objective. A bank’s profits (1) can be rewritten as
πi = [al + υl,i − Li − blL−i − (r + η)]Li − (cl + γl,i)Li
+ [(r + η)(1− α)− ad − υd,i −Di − bdD−i]Di − (cd + γd,i)Di.
Notice that this expression can be reinterpreted as if it was derived from a model with
uncertain demand and deterministic costs. Indeed, the demand functions can be rewritten
as rl,i(Li, L−i) = al+υl,i−γl,i−Li− blL−i and rd,i(Di, D−i) = ad+υd,i−γd,i−Di− bdD−i
and the costs as Ci(Di, Li) = clLi+cdDi. Therefore, for notational simplicity, we normalise
cost uncertainty by setting γl ≡ 0 and γd ≡ 0. As a result,
πi = [al + υl,i − Li − blL−i − (r + η)]Li − clLi
+ [(r + η)(1− α)− ad − υd,i −Di − bdD−i]Di − cdDi.
Following the results of Hughes and Mester (1998), we assume that the banks are risk-
averse. For simplicity, we assume that they have identical mean variance preferences over
their (random) profits, U(·) = E(·)− R
2
V ar(·), where R is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion.5
3 Analysis of Competition
Specialising the model to the case with homogenous products (bd = bl = 1), each bank
solves
max Li,DiE(πi)−
R
2
V ar(πi), where (2)
E(πi) = [al − Li − L−i − r]Li − clLi + [ad + r(1− α)−Di −D−i]Di − cdDi
V ar(πi) =
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢
L2i +
£
(1− α)2σ2η + σ2υd
¤
D2i + 2DiLiρl,dσυlσυd,
for given expectations of the amount of loans, L−i, and deposits, D−i, oﬀered by their
rivals.
5Mean-variance preferences can be obtained from a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility
function with normal random shocks.
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Our first result is that in the presence of uncertainty the loan and the deposit markets
are interdependent. In the following proposition, we characterise the Nash equilibrium of
this game.
Proposition 1 In the unique equilibrium, each bank i = 1, ..., n oﬀers an amount of loans
equal to
L∗ =
(al − r − cl)
£
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2η(1− α)2 + σ2υd
¢¤
−Rρl,dσυlσυd [r(1− α)− ad − cd]£
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢¤ £
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2η(1− α)2 + σ2υd
¢¤
−R2ρ2l,dσ2υlσ2υd
and collects an amount of deposits equal to
D∗ =
(r(1− α)− ad − cd)
£
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢¤
−Rρl,dσυlσυd (al − r − cl)£
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2η(1− α)2 + σ2υd
¢¤ £
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢¤
−R2ρ2l,dσ2υlσ2υd
.
The optimal deposit rate is not independent of the loan market and the optimal loan
rate is not independent of the deposit market. This result is in contrast with the classic
separation result in the Monti-Klein model without uncertainty (see Freixas and Rochet,
1997). As shown by Dermine (1986), the separation result between credit and deposit
markets also breaks down under risk neutrality once the possibility of default by borrowers
and banks is introduced. In his model, the loan rate is independent of the deposit rate,
but the loan rate depends on the deposit rate in the absence of deposit insurance. A bank
can reduce deposit rates by granting less loans and thereby reducing the probability of
bankruptcy.
Back to our model, the separation result is re-established for the special case with zero
correlation between loans and deposits. Substituting ρl,d = 0 in the previous expressions,
we obtain
L∗ =
al − r − cl
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢ and D∗ = r(1− α)− ad − cd
n+ 1 +R
£
(1− α)2σ2η + σ2υd
¤ . (3)
The individual loan and deposit interest rates fluctuate with the realization of the
demands to meet the above quantities. Substituting (3) into the demand for loans, the
expected loan rate, however, is symmetric,
E(r∗l,i) =
al
£
1 +R
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢¤
+ nr + ncl
n+ 1 +R
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢ . (4)
Similarly, substituting (3) into the demand for deposits, the expected deposit rate is
E(r∗d,i) =
nr(1− α) + ad
£
1 +R
£
(1− α)2σ2η + σ2υd
¤¤
− ncd
n+ 1 +R
£
(1− α)2σ2η + σ2υd
¤ . (5)
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Figure 1: Selection of optimal amount of loans in the presence of uncertainty in the
interbank rate.
As in the deterministic setting, an increase in the expected interest rate r pushes both
the optimal deposit rate and the optimal loan rate up. The intuition, as we can see in
the general profit function (1), is that increasing the expected interest rate has the same
consequences as an upward shift in the demand for deposits and an upward shift in the
marginal cost of loans. As a result, less loans will be oﬀered and more deposits will be
collected, as we can see in (3).
The level of interest rate uncertainty, on the other hand, aﬀects the loan and deposit
rates in opposite directions. While the deposit rate decreases, the loan rate increases
with the level of uncertainty. Being risk averse, banks wish to perform relatively well in
the event of a negative shock even if this hampers performance if the shock turns out to
be positive. With respect to loan competition, although banks expect positive shocks to
compensate the negative shocks, E(η) = 0, they give more weight at performing well in
the event of a bad demand shock, η > 0, than in the event of a positive shock, η < 0.
Similarly, they prefer to perform well in the case of a lower-than-expected demand shock,
υl,i < 0. Both eﬀects induce banks to oﬀer less loans and therefore push the loan rate
upwards.
To see this, suppose that a bank faces a deterministic residual demand but an uncertain
interbank rate. As illustrated in Figure 1, the interbank rate can be either high (i.e.,
equal to 4) or low (0) with equal probabilities. A risk neutral bank would optimally oﬀer
the optimal amount of loans (equal to 4) for the expected interbank rate (2). A bank
that wishes to optimize performance in the worst case scenario, however, would select
8
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Figure 2: Selection of optimal amount of loans in the presence of uncertainty in the demand
for loans.
the optimal quantity for the case in which the interbank rate is high. If the bank were
extremely risk averse, it would select a loan amount of 3. In general, higher levels of risk
aversion induce the bank to cut the level of outstanding loans, from 4 and down towards
3.6
Similarly, a bank that faces an uncertain demand for loans will also set lower quantities
and therefore higher rates. Suppose, as shown in Figure 2, that the demand can be either
high (i.e. with an intercept equal to 12) or low (8) with equal probabilities but interest
rates are deterministic and together with marginal costs add up to 2. A risk neutral bank
would oﬀer a quantity of 4 and therefore the loan rate would fluctuate between 4 (if the
demand is low) and 8 (if the demand is high). A risk averse bank, however, would select
a lower quantity in order to increase profits when the demand is low.
In contrast, higher uncertainty pushes the optimal deposit rate downwards. Being risk
averse, the bank wishes to perform relatively well in the event of a lower than expected
interbank rate, η < 0 (and, similarly, in the event of a higher-than-expected deposit
demand shock, υd,i > 0). As we can see in Figure 3, a bank will tend to collect a quantity
closer to 1 unit of deposits, the optimal deposit quantity for a low interbank rate (3), and
more distant from 3 units, the optimal deposit quantity for the expected interbank rate
(4). To collect a lower amount of deposits, the bank would set a lower deposit rate.
6Equivalently, the bank would increase the loan rates above 6.
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Figure 3: Selection of optimal amount of deposits in the presence of uncertainty in the
interbank rate.
4 Merger Analysis
In this section we extend our basic model to study bank mergers. Suppose that we add an
additional stage in which, prior to competing in the market, a group of k banks (denoted by
t = 1, ..., k) decide whether to merge. Following the approach of Salant et al. (1983), each
bank compares the expected utility of merging with that of remaining independent, and
agrees to merge if the former exceeds the latter. Since the merging banks are symmetric,
they will unanimously agree on whether to merge or not. We are therefore checking when
merging is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
4.1 Post-Merger Quantities
As shown in Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006), the merging banks would optimally split
the profits of the new company evenly, i.e. the merger should be a “merger of equals”.7
Each of the merging parties, the insiders (t = 1, ..., k), wishes to select Lt and Dt such that
maxE
µ
1
k
kP
t=1
πt
¶
− R
2
V ar
µ
1
k
kP
t=1
πt
¶
. (6)
The remaining banks, the outsiders (o = k + 1, ..., n), maximize (2) as before. In the
unique equilibrium the loan amounts oﬀered are, respectively,
L∗t =
(al − r − cl) (Sl − 1)
k(SlPl − 1)
and L∗o =
(al − r − cl) [Pl − 1]
(n− k) (SlPl − 1)
, (7)
7Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006) studies the terms of the agreement between merging firms, which
should specify the allocation of fixed cash payments and shares of profits of the new company. If firms
compete in quantities merging firms prefer to merge as equals, whereby the shares are evenly split and
there is no fixed payment.
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where Sl = 1+
£
1 +R
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢¤
/ (n− k) and Pl = 2+R
¡
[1 + ρl(k − 1)]σ2υl + kσ
2
η
¢
/k2.8
Similarly, the equilibrium deposit levels are, respectively,
D∗t =
(r(1− α)− ad − cd) (Sd − 1)
k(SdPd − 1)
and D∗o =
(r(1− α)− ad − cd) [Pd − 1]
(n− k) (SdPd − 1)
, (8)
where Sd = 1 +
£
1 +R
¡
σ2υd + (1− α)
2σ2η
¢¤
/ (n− k) and Pd = 2 +R[(1 + ρl(k − 1))σ2υl +
k(1− α)2σ2η]/k2.
4.2 Merger Consequences
In this subsection, we analyse the impact of mergers on borrower and depositor welfare.9
Comparing (7) and (3), the insiders oﬀer more loans after the merger whenever
(1− ρl)Rσ2υl ≥ k. (9)
In the standard case with risk neutrality (R = 0) or without demand risk (σ2υl = 0), the
insiders reduce production and therefore are better able to exploit their increased market
power. In the presence of demand risk and risk aversion, a merger results in an increase in
the risk-bearing potential of the insiders. A positive shock in one of the markets served by
the merged entity may be oﬀset by a negative shock in one of its other markets. Because
of this diversification eﬀect, the merged entity is more willing to take on risk by oﬀering
more loans.
Comparing (7) and (3), the outsiders increase their loan oﬀers after the merger exactly
whenever (9) is not satisfied. The outsiders’ reaction, however, is never strong enough
to compensate for the change of the insiders. The total production then increases when-
ever condition (9) is satisfied. Mergers bring about additional diversification gains which
would not be feasible otherwise. Eﬃciencies gains from risk sharing are equivalent to cost
synergies, as defined by Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
Similarly, comparing (8) and (3), the insiders oﬀer more deposits after the merger
whenever
(1− ρd)Rσ2υd ≥ k. (10)
As shown in Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006), borrower and depositor welfare in
8Since Sl − 1 > 0, Pl − 1 > 0 and SlPl − 1 > 0 all banks oﬀer a positive amount.
9For the analysis of the impact of mergers on social welfare, see Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006).
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this setting is defined by
CSb =
1
2
µ
nP
i=1
Li
¶2
and CSd =
1
2
µ
nP
i=1
Di
¶2
, (11)
and therefore borrowers are better oﬀ when more loans are oﬀered and borrowers are better
oﬀ when more deposits are collected. Therefore, the next proposition follows straightfor-
wardly from the previous analysis.
Proposition 2 When firms are risk neutral, no merger increases borrower or depositor
welfare. When firms are risk averse, mergers improve borrower and depositor welfare if
and only if (1− ρl)Rσ2υl ≥ k and (1− ρd)Rσ
2
υd ≥ k, respectively.
If the shocks are not perfectly correlated, for high enough levels of risk aversion, the
merger reduces rates and benefits borrowers and depositors. Suppose for example that in
the market for loans there is distributional uncertainty only. As we showed in Section 2,
this implies that σ2υl =
n−1
n σ
2
θl and ρl = −
1
n−1 . Hence, the merger benefits borrowers if
and only if R ≥ nk/(n + 1)σ2θl . On the other hand, if the shocks are perfectly correlated
(ρl = 1) then merger never increases borrower welfare.
If one has information on the relative levels of uncertainty and correlation of the de-
mands for loans and the supplies of deposits, one could assess the relative eﬀects of mergers
to borrowers and depositors.
Corollary 3 If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, then a bank merger
is worse for depositors than it is for borrowers.
If, for example, bank runs (but not bank panics) are a serious concern then the supplies
of deposits are likely to be more correlated than the demands for loans. In that case, our
model predicts that a merger is more likely to increase deposit rates than loan rates and
be therefore more detrimental for depositors than for borrowers.
4.3 Incentives to Merge
In the absence of uncertainty, Salant et al. (1983) have shown that banks oﬀering homo-
geneous loans and deposit services have limited incentives to merge. As a result of the
merger the insiders become less aggressive and outsiders free ride on the insiders’ attempts
to raise loan rates and lower deposit rates. In uncertain markets, risk-neutral banks decide
12
to oﬀer and merge exactly as in models without uncertainty, with the only diﬀerence that
variables are replaced by their expected values. The presence of risk aversion, however,
makes merging banks more aggressive following the merger.
Proposition 4 Mergers occur in a larger set of industry configurations for higher levels
of risk aversion.
The risk-bearing potential of merged banks is higher for any type of uncertainty. If
there is perfect correlation, for example, the merged bank does not obtain any direct
benefit from diversification but is nevertheless more aggressive in the product market, as if
it had a superior production function (see the Appendix). The merging bank is larger and
therefore better able to cope with the uncertainty present in the market. If the correlation
is lower (as it is in the case of distributional uncertainty), the merging banks perform even
better, because they are also able to diversify risk. This advantage is amplified by the
strategic eﬀect on competitors, who become more reluctant to take risk.
Non-merging banks oﬀer more loans and deposits than before the merger exactly when
expected loan rates are higher and expected deposit rates are lower. Therefore, the lending
and deposit activities will generate more profits whenever conditions (9) and (10) are
satisfied, respectively.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a framework for analysing the role of risk and diversification in
banking competition and mergers. In our model with mean variance preferences, the
willingness of an individual bank to take on an additional risky position on the deposit or
loan side of the market depends on the bank’s overall portfolio of positions. The twist with
respect to the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model is that banks have market power, so
that they take into account the eﬀect of their positions on market prices (here, loan and
deposit rates).
To illustrate the simple logic of this framework, we focus here on the case of quantity
competition as in the oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model presented in Freixas
and Rochet (1997). We obtain a closed-form characterization of the equilibrium with a
linear demand system. In this context, we show that the two sides of the market are
separable provided that the shocks to the demand for loans are uncorrelated with the
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shocks to the supply of deposits. The welfare eﬀects of mergers depends on the importance
of diversification, which in turn depends on the variance of the shocks, their correlation
and the banks’ initial risk aversion. We show that bank mergers are relatively worse for
depositors than for borrowers when depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers.
Our results are consistent with Sapienza’s (2002) empirical findings for Italy. In her
data, mergers among banks with small market shares reduced loan rates, while mergers
between large banks led to higher rates. These findings indicate that the increase in
market power domininated cost synergies. Although part of these synergies may be due
to operational cost savings, part might be due to risk diversification. More precisely, she
finds that the small mergers’ reduction in loan rates is higher when the merging banks
operate in the same geographical area. If distributional uncertainty is important, the
demand shocks within the same geographical area should be negatively correlated whereas
the shocks across diﬀerent geographical areas should not. As we show in the paper, a lower
correlation is indeed more likely to induce a reduction in the loan rates.
Our framework can be extended to allow for competition in prices rather than quanti-
ties. When banks compete in prices, the behaviour in the loan and deposit market may be
diﬀerent. As shown by Asplund (2002), with price competition the firms’ reaction depends
on whether the uncertainty is on the supply or the demand side. Risk averse firms should
set higher prices if there is cost uncertainty but lower prices if there is demand uncertainty.
The diﬀerent nature of the reaction to supply and demand shocks under price competi-
tion introduces additional complications because banks compete for loans and deposits.
Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006) show that with cost uncertainty firms face a trade-oﬀ
between diversification and strategic commitment and choose an asymmetric sharing rule
(intermediate between takeover and merger of equals). As a consequence, banks may no
longer prefer to merge as equals. A more general analysis is necessary to derive firm con-
clusions about the eﬀects of bank mergers on borrower and depositor welfare. We leave
this problem to future research.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
To prove that more mergers take place when firms are more risk averse, we show that
merged banks have a relatively better “technology” as the risk aversion parameter in-
creases. Here, technology refers to the costs associated with the uncertainty and risk
aversion. From (2), before merging, each firm has a technology given by
Tb,i ≡
R
2
©¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢
L2i +
£
(1− α)2σ2η + σ2υd
¤
D2i
ª
and therefore the merging firms combined have a technology given by Tb = Tb,l + Tb,d,
where
Tb,l ≡
R
2
¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢Pk
i=1 L
2
i and Tb,d ≡
R
2
£
(1− α)2σ2η + σ2υd
¤Pk
i=1D
2
i .
Substituting from (6), they have, as post-merger technology, Ta = Ta,l + Ta,d, where
Ta,l ≡
R
2k
h¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢Pk
i=1 L
2
i + ρlσ
2
υl
P
t,j,t6=j LtLj
i
,
and
Ta,d ≡
R
2k
n£
(1− α)2σ2η + σ2υd
¤
D2i + ρlσ
2
υd
P
t,j,t 6=j DtDj
o
.
Suppose first that ρl = 1. Then
Tb,l − Ta,l =
R
2
½¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢Pk
i=1 L
2
i −
1
k
h¡
σ2υl + σ
2
η
¢Pk
i=1 L
2
i + σ
2
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.
Rearranging we obtain
Tb,l − Ta,l =
R
2
"
σ2η
k − 1
k
Pk
i=1 L
2
i + σ
2
υl
P
t,j,t 6=j
(Lt − Lj)2
#
≥ 0.
Similarly, from Tb,l−Ta,l ≥ 0 we obtain Tb−Ta ≥ 0. As we wanted to show, the technology is
better after the merger and the diﬀerence increases as the risk aversion parameter increases.
For lower levels of correlation, ρl ≤ 1, the diﬀerence is even larger and it increases even
more rapidly.
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